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Abstract. Input transformation based defense strategies fall short in
defending against strong adversarial attacks. Some successful defenses
adopt approaches that either increase the randomness within the ap-
plied transformations, or make the defense computationally intensive,
making it substantially more challenging for the attacker. However, it
limits the applicability of such defenses as a pre-processing step, similar
to computationally heavy approaches that use retraining and network
modifications to achieve robustness to perturbations. In this work, we
propose a defense strategy that applies random image corruptions to
the input image alone, constructs a self-correlation based subspace fol-
lowed by a projection operation to suppress the adversarial perturbation.
Due to its simplicity, the proposed defense is computationally efficient as
compared to the state-of-the-art, and yet can withstand huge perturba-
tions. Further, we develop proximity relationships between the projection
operator of a clean image and of its adversarially perturbed version, via
bounds relating geodesic distance on the Grassmannian to matrix Frobe-
nius norms. We empirically show that our strategy is complementary to
other weak defenses like JPEG compression and can be seamlessly in-
tegrated with them to create a stronger defense. We present extensive
experiments on the ImageNet dataset across four different models namely
InceptionV3, ResNet50, VGG16 and MobileNet models with perturba-
tion magnitude set to  = 16. Unlike state-of-the-art approaches, even
without any retraining, the proposed strategy achieves an absolute im-
provement of ∼ 4.5% in defense accuracy on ImageNet.
Keywords: Grassmann manifold, adversarial defense, input transfor-
mation
1 Introduction
Adversarial attacks are small imperceptible perturbations carefully crafted to
modify an image that can mislead the classification ability of state-of-the-art
classifiers. Robustness of deep neural networks to such attacks [5,16,3,26] rapidly
became an active area of research due to the increasing adoption rates of deep
? Work done as a visiting research scholar at Arizona State University, USA
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learning based systems in practical applications often with high reliability and
security requirements. Since these applications range from autonomous driving
[29] to medical evaluations [2], the robustness of these models to adversarial
perturbations is a crucial aspect for their reliability.
Consequently, recent years have witnessed the development of both, ad-
versaries [16,5] that challenge the robustness of deep models, as well as the
design of defense strategies to mitigate their effect. White box attacks have
emerged as the most challenging form of adversarial attacks, where the ad-
versary has access to model parameters, training data as well as the defense
strategy. In order to provide security against such attacks, various approaches
like [11,15,5,28,24,27,17,19] have focused on improving the model’s robustness
by modifying either the network, the loss function and/or the training strat-
egy. While these approaches have been successful to a great extent, many of
them have either model or attack dependencies. Moreover, defenses that rely
on adversarial training, i.e, the use of adversarially perturbed samples at train
time, typically incur significant computational costs. For example, the recently
proposed feature denoising approach [28] required synchronized training on 128
NVIDIA V100 GPUs for 52 hours to train a baseline ResNet-152 model on Ima-
geNet. While there have been efforts to reduce this training time, e.g., [19], which
achieved a 5× speed-up in training, it still required 128 TPUs. In most practical
scenarios, such hardware infrastructure is not readily accessible, and even when
it is, these approaches assume the access to the model and the training data.
On the other hand, there exist alternate defense strategies that do not require
knowledge of the model or the training data and are more widely applicable.
To make existing systems more robust to adversarial attacks, several ap-
proaches employ simple pre-processing or post processing strategies [6,18,22,13]
that can be augmented with the deployed models directly at inference time. For
example, input transformations like JPEG compression, bit depth reduction and
image quilting pre-process an image before feeding it to the network to reduce
the effect of adversarial noise. The success of these transforms is due to gradient
obfuscation that results in incorrect or undefined gradients, limiting the impact
of the typical gradient based white-box attacker. However, work by Athalye et
al [1] overcame this shortcoming by computing gradient approximations in such
scenarios, drastically dropping the performance of many defense strategies, and
often completely defeating them (0 % classification accuracy over adversarial
samples).
Recently, the work in [20] proposed a heuristic approach, Barrage of Random
Transformation (BaRT) achieving state-of-the art defense performance on the
ResNet50 model on ImageNet dataset. The defense is performed by applying a
subset of image transforms in random ordering that are selected randomly from
a large pool of stochastic image transformations (e.g., FFT, swirl, contrast, to
name a few). The key insight from BaRT’s approach is that this compounded
randomness drastically inhibits the adversary’s capability to correctly mimic
the defense behavior. However, to cope up with the drastic changes in the input
image due to large variations in the transforms required in BaRT, the network is
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Fig. 1. Left: Representation of subspaces as points on the Grassmannian manifold.
The subspace corresponding to the perturbed sample Xp lies close to the subspace of
its clean sample Xc counterpart. The distance between these two subspaces in shown
to be upper bounded as given by Eq. (8). Centre and Right: The histograms show
that subspaces of a pair of images of same class are closer than subspaces of image
pair formed from different classes. Given an adversarial sample, the plot highlights
that the geodesic distance between clean sample subspace X lc and its corresponding
adversarially perturbed sample X lp, is such that d(X lc ,X lp) < d(X l
′
c ,X lp). Here l and l′
represent two different classes. The plot is shown for 8000 similar (X lc ,X lp) and 8000
dissimilar pairs (X l′c ,X lp). The normalized histogram for these pairs is shown for two
models on ImageNet dataset : InceptionV3 (Center) and ResNet50 (Right)
fine-tuned to ensure model’s familiarity with the defense at the inference time.
On the other hand, Dubey et al. [4] defend adversarial attacks by averaging model
prediction probabilities of k-nearest neighbors for a given sample. Interestingly,
they motivate the nearest neighbor search in an unrelated, web-scale dataset
with billions of images, where the aforementioned approach of averaging the
prediction probabilities is aimed at projecting the adversarial test example back
on to the image manifold. These approaches either need to fine-tune the model
[20], or need access to an external database [4], and may not strictly qualify as
an input transformation based defense.
To achieve our goal of devising an input transformation based defense, from
the discussion above, we make two crucial observations that contribute in under-
mining the white-box adversary’s ability to generate an attack: First is the com-
pounded randomness in the transformations applied to the input image. Second
is the access to a set of similar images (identified as neighbors in the web-scaled
database in case of Dubey et al [4]) to have an averaging or smoothening effect
over predictions, leading to more accurate predictions for an adversarial sam-
ple. Contrary to [20,4], we take an approach that simply relies only on a given
sample and leverages benefits from both, the compounded random transforma-
tions as well as smoothing. However, the random transforms and smoothing are
performed in a principled manner that reduces the impact of adversarial noise,
without significant changes in the image. This makes our approach a model-
agnostic, inference-time defense, that does not rely on additional data or training
to achieve the desired goal of adversarial security.
Our proposed approach, Grassmannian of Corrupted Images for Adversarial
Security (GraCIAS) applies a random number of randomized filtering opera-
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tions to the input test image. These filtered images provide a basis for a lower
dimensional subspace, which is then used for smoothing the input image. Due
to a principled structure of generated image corruptions used for defining the
subspace, it permits projection and reconstruction of the input image without
substantial loss of information. Furthermore, we can interpret these subspaces as
points on the Grassmann manifold, which permits us to derive an upper bound
on the geodesic distance between the subspaces obtained by filtering a clean
sample and its adversarially perturbed counterpart. This is also supported with
empirical analysis, which suggests that the geodesic distances between the sub-
spaces corresponding to clean and adversarial examples belonging to the same
class are smaller than those corresponding to examples from different classes.
Figure 1 illustrates the subspace representation and shows that the distribution
of geodesic distances computed between subspace pairs of the same class and
that of different classes are reasonably separable. This observation is central to
our approach and validates that our choice of filters ensure a low-dimensional
subspace that is representative of the test sample’s original class, and serves as
an appropriate smoothing operator for the input samples. Through extensive
experiments on the ImageNet dataset, we show the effectiveness of GraCIAS on
several models under attack of various strengths. We summarize our contribu-
tions below:
– The proposed input transformation based defense achieves state-of-the-art
results on ImageNet dataset for ResNet50, InceptionV3, VGG16 and Mo-
bileNet models under different attacker strength in white box attack sce-
nario.
– As opposed to state of the art randomized input transformation approaches,
GraCIAS benefits not only from its intrinsic random parametrization, but
also from the theoretical motivation that suggests retention of task-relevant
information and suppression of adversarial noise.
– Due to its simplicity and computational efficiency, the proposed defense can
be integrated with existing weak defenses like JPEG compression to create
stronger defenses, as shown in our experiments.
2 Previous Work
The vulnerability of neural networks to adversarial perturbations has led the
growth of a large number of defense strategies. Given the large volume of work
in this area, we categorize the literature into two broad groups and briefly review
recent developments in them.
Robust Training and Network Modification. Robust training refers to
strategies that retrain a model with an augmented training set. The most pop-
ular strategies use adversarial training [15,5,11], where adversarially perturbed
samples are included in the training set on the fly, i.e., during the model training.
These approaches, while effective, are very computationally expensive, as the at-
tacks have to be regenerated multiple times during the entire training process.
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On the other hand, approaches [28,27] modify network architecture to achieve
adversarial robustness. Xie et al [28] added feature denoising blocks in the model
to circumvent the impact of noisy feature maps caused due to adversarial pertur-
bations at the input. Whereas, [27] transformed layerwise convolutional feature
map into a new manifold using non-linear radial basis functions. However, both
robust training and network modification, not only require access to model pa-
rameters and training data, but also necessary computational resources to per-
form the retraining, which may be nontrivial to obtain. This requirement poses
a bottleneck in securing the already deployed systems for various applications
that are built on deep learning models. Therefore, in case of restrictions on com-
putational resources or access to model parameters, add-on defenses in the form
of pre-processing blocks at the input or output of a network are viable.
Input Transformations. The limitations of the previous category are ad-
dressed by the input transformation based approaches, which aim to denoise
the image before feeding it to the network for classification. Most transforma-
tion based defenses like the ones proposed in [6], e.g., image compression, bit
depth reduction, image quilting etc., lead to obfuscated gradient, a way of gra-
dient masking that gives a false sense of security. Such defenses have limited
robustness on a given model under powerful attacks [1]. Other approaches that
have been successful to some extent under strong attacks like the Barrage of Ran-
dom Transforms (BaRT) [20] follow a highly randomized approach to choose at
random from an enormous pool of transformations, making it difficult for the
attacker to break. BaRT requires the model to be finetuned on the input trans-
formations to reduce the drop in performance on clean samples. Another defense
in this category [13] improves the standard JPEG compression to tackle the ad-
versarial attack without significant drop in performance of clean samples. Other
approaches exist that assume access to the training set. They either learn valid
range spaces of clean samples, or use the training set to approximate the image
manifold, on which the input image is projected [22,24].
Our proposed approach GraCIAS is also an input transformation based ap-
proach. We emphasize that unlike most existing approaches, our defense is ag-
nostic to model and the training set used.
3 Proposed Approach
Given a trained deep network, an adversary can add an imperceptible perturba-
tion to the input sample that forces the model to make a wrong prediction. For a
given sample x, an adversary generates a sample xˆ = x+δ such that its label l(·)
does not match that of the original sample, i.e., l(x) 6= l(xˆ). Thus, the objective
of an attacker can be understood as follows arg maxL(x + δ, y) s.t. ‖δ‖p < 
Here, y = l(x) is the ground truth label of sample x, δ is the added pertur-
bation and  is the perturbation bound.
Design Goal: The goal of an input transformation based defense strategy is
to ‘clean’ an adversarial sample before feeding it into a classification network.
The ‘cleaning’ should reduce mis-classifications due to the perturbation, while
6 A. Shukla et al.
Fig. 2. An overview of GraCIAS defense applied on an adversarial sample. The num-
ber of k random filters are used for creating a set of corrupted images. These image
are used to estimate a random d dimensional subspace that is used for obtaining the
low dimensional representation followed by re-projection to image space to obtain a
rectified image.
maintaining performance on clean samples. In this work, we propose an input
transformation-based inference time approach that is simple and methodically
randomized to achieve effective defense.
We strive to achieve this design goal and develop our defense strategy Gra-
CIAS combines simple randomized corruptions, subspace projections and a ge-
ometric perspective on the input transformations. Figure 2 shows an overview
of our approach, which we describe in detail in the following sections.
3.1 Proposed Defense Strategy
The process of generating the transform to rectify an adversarial sample xp is
described as follows.
Image Set for Subspace Approximation. The aim of an input defense strat-
egy is to find a transform that can estimate a clean sample from a given adver-
sarial sample. As opposed to Barrage of random transforms [20], we focus on
developing a random transform that is minimal without compromising the ef-
fectiveness of the transform. Our transform comprises of a projection step from
image space to a low dimensional space and a reconstruction step to project back
to image space. The first step is to generate a database required for estimating
the subspace for projecting the adversarial sample. To this end, we use random
image filtering to generate several noisy versions of a given adversarial sample.
For k such random filters, the set of k blurred images can be written as
Xp = {xp ∗ h1,xp ∗ h2, ....xp ∗ hk} (1)
This step essentially corresponds to mixing a uniformly structured noise to the
non uniform noise in the image caused due to adversarial perturbation. This
mixing is achieved by multiple convolutions with kernels {h1, h2...hk} that have
uniformly distributed weights normalized to have unit `1-norm i.e. hi(m,n) ∼
U [0, 1] and ||V ec(hi)||1 = 1, where V ec() is the vectorization operator and m,n
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are the indices of the kernel. In addition to the random kernels, the number
of such kernels, k to create the set of corresponding k images is also picked at
random from a fixed range of values krange. This choice of randomizing filter
kernels and their number is driven by our goal of increasing randomness in the
defense. Such random filters are more effective than other filters like gaussian
blur, where their parametric nature is much easier for attacker to approximate.
Randomized Subspace for Projection. As Xp is derived from random fil-
tering of the input image itself, the span of its elements is likely to retain some
information relevant for the end task. So we simply find an orthogonal basis for
the subspace spanned by Xp. The projection of the input image on to this sub-
space has a blurring effect on the adversarial perturbation mixed with random
noise. In the absence of the adversarial perturbations, i.e., for clean samples, a
similar blurring is expected along with retention of task-relevant information.
Computing the basis for the subspace is computationally inexpensive even for
high resolution datasets like ImageNet as the set of corrupted images is fairly
small.
Re-projection into Image Space. The final step is to reconstruct the im-
age from the low dimensional mapping obtained in the previous step. As in
PCA based reconstruction using the low dimensional mapping and the inverse
transform, we obtain the restored image. The basis of the subspace will capture
relevant image content in the first few leading principal components while the
noisy components are captured by the later. Thus, restoring to a low dimensional
subspace will filter out the noisy components. However, using a fixed dimension
for subspace can be easily estimated by a white box adversary, weakening the
defense effectiveness. Therefore, the dimension of the subspace is defined based
on retaining a specific value of variance in the data. The variance value is se-
lected randomly from a predefined range of values. This adds another level of
randomness in choosing the subspace dimension, making the defense effective in
the the presence of an adaptive attacker that is aware of the defense strategy.
3.2 Validity of Proposed Subspace
We now present our analysis to show that the subspace estimated with an ad-
versarial example is close to subspace created with clean image counterpart. Our
theoretical result is based on bounds obtained on the geodesic distance between
the subspaces constructed by using the clean sample xc and the adversarially
perturbed sample xp.
The column space of Xp and Xc are the subspaces containing the set of
convolutions of xp and xc with random kernels hi i.e., span(Xp) and span(Xc)
respectively. We represent the subspaces as Xp and Xc for perturbed and clean
image respectively, which are both d-dimensional subspaces in RN , where N =
3mn. Now, we want to compare these linear d-dimensional subspaces in RN
for which we make use of the Grassmann Manifold, GN,d, which is an analytic
manifold, where each point represents a d-dimensional subspace in RN regardless
of the specific bases of the subspace. The distance between the two subspaces
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is then given by the geodesic distance between the points on the Grassmann
manifold. The normalized shortest geodesic distance is defined as follows
dng(Xc,Xp) = 1
D
dg(Xc,Xp) (2)
Here, D is the maximum possible distance on GN,d [10,12]. It was shown in [10],
that this normalized distance is upper bounded by the following expression
dng(Xc,Xp) ≤ ‖Xc‖F
∥∥X†c∥∥2 ‖∆X‖F‖Xc‖F (3)
≤ ∥∥X†c∥∥2 ‖∆X‖F (4)
Here,
∥∥X†c∥∥2 is the spectral norm of pseudo inverse of Xc, ∆X = Xc − Xp
and ‖·‖F denotes the Frobenius norm. Rewriting, 3 with squaring on both sides
as
d2ng(Xc,Xp) ≤
∥∥X†c∥∥22 ‖∆X‖2F (5)
Here,
∥∥X†c∥∥2 corresponds to the smallest eigenvalue of the X†c i.e. inverse of the
smallest singular value of X(xc). Hence, we can write the following∥∥X†∥∥
2
=
1
σmin(X)
(6)
In case of natural images the σmin is non-zero. The eigenvalues of a blurred
image decay faster than the clean images, as the blurred images are dominated
by low frequency components [7]. Similarly, the other factor in the right side of
(5) is given by
‖∆X‖2F =
∑
i
‖Hi‖2 ‖δ‖2 (7)
Here, Hi’s are BTTB matrices that are full rank under zero boundary condition
for convolution and δ is the adversarial noise added to the clean image. Thus,
substituting (6) and (7) in (5), we get
d2ng(Xc,Xp) ≤
1
σmin(X)
∑
i
‖Hi‖2 ‖δ‖2 (8)
The bound in the above equation establishes that the subspaces of clean and
adversarial sample are in close proximity, as long as the singular value term is
bounded above. To show the latter, we adopt the following approach. It is not
possible to provide a general bound on σmin(X) without assuming something
about natural image statistics. On the other hand, it is easy to see that σmin(X)
is small only for pathological examples. Consider the case of σmin(X) = 0. This
happens if and only if the columns of X are linearly dependent. That is, there
must exist non-zero scalars αi such that:
xc =
∑
i
αi (xc ∗ hi) (9)
GraCIAS 9
Using simple Fourier transform arguments, it can be shown that the above
happens only under pathological cases such as when xc is a constant-image, or
the filters hi are all just plain delta functions. For any general situation, σmin(X)
is finite, although a general lower bound is hard to find.
The random filtering and the subspace projection reduces the effect of adver-
sarial noise. Further, in the above discussion, we have established that the sub-
spaces derived from clean samples and those from their adversarially perturbed
counterparts are close to each other. If such a subspace Xc is representative of
the clean sample, i.e., if it captures information relevant to the end task, then
a nearby subspace like Xp is also likely to retain similar information. Therefore,
a projection and reconstruction operation on such a subspace (Xc or Xp) will
achieve our objective of reducing adversarial noise and yet retaining relevant
information. In addition to this proximity guarantee in (8), our empirical anal-
ysis of geodesics in Fig. 1 shows that the geodesic distances between subspaces
obtained from an adversarial sample is closer to its clean counterpart than that
of another clean image from a different class.
This observation along with our proximity result is the basis of our main
hypothesis: The subspaces resulting from our randomly corrupted versions of
the input image are sufficiently representative to retain task-relevant informa-
tion and yet are effective transformations in attenuating adversarial noise. In
the following sections, we validate this hypothesis through extensive empirical
evaluation and analysis experiments.
4 Results
In this section, we firstly evaluate our defense strategy as pre-processing at in-
ference time on adversarial samples generated with different perturbation mag-
nitude as well as attacker’s knowledge. Secondly, we also present ablation ex-
periments to thoroughly evaluate the choice of parameters used in the proposed
defense strategy. Now, we list down the dataset, models and attack methods
used to evaluate the performance of our defense strategy.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets and Models. We present a series of experiments to evaluate the
effectiveness of our defense strategy.
ImageNet-50K[21] dataset contains images of different sizes distributed along
1000 categories. The images are processed to 256×256 dimensions encoded with
24 bit color. The validation set consists of 50,000 images. We represent this entire
set as ImageNet-50K and a subset of first 10,000 images as ImageNet-10K for
our experiments. For ImageNet [21], we evaluate the performance on InceptionV3
[25], Resent50[8], MobileNet [9] and VGG16 [23]. We used pre-trained models
available in Tensorflow.
Comparison with other Approaches. We compare our defense strategy with
several input transformations that are summarized below:
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JPEG compression, BitDepth reduction [6] and JPEGDNN [14]:
These defenses are applied to an image only at the inference time. Similar to
our approach, these approaches are model agnostic and hence can easily be
integrated with existing systems. We used the framework of [1] and the authors’
implementation from github for evaluating these defenses under different attack
scenarios. The JPEG defense is performed at a compression quality level of 75
(out of 100) and the images are reduced to 3 bits for BitDepth defense in all
our experiments. For JPEGDNN, we used default parameters available with the
authors’ implementation that is available on github.
Barrage of Random Transformation [20] We compared state-of-the art
performance of BaRT on ResNet50 model with our defense strategy on Ima-
geNet50K. As the authors’ implementation is not publicly available, we use re-
sults as reported in their paper in our comparisons. While we outperform BaRT
on accuracy of attacked images by a significant margin, our performance on
clean images is lower. However, it is important to point out that BaRT’s model
is fine-tuned for an addition 100 epochs with their transformed images, whereas
we use the original model.
Parameters in GraCIAS. In our defense strategy there are two steps that
require random parameter choice. First is the number of filters k to create the
set of corrupted images as given by 1. To limit the computational cost, it is
chosen from a fixed range krange. This range is set to U [10, 60] i.e. a minimum
of 10 corrupted images to a maximum of 60. The other random parameter that
adds to the robustness of the proposed defense strategy is the dimensionality
of the subspace defined on the set of the set of images mentioned earlier. The
dimension is computed based on the % of data variance retained while computing
the PCA basis. In order to avoid information loss and drastic image changes,
the variance is selected between 60 % to 95% at random. The third parameter
is the kernel size for the filtering operation. The filter size is fixed to 7 × 7 for
ImageNet dataset.
4.2 White Box Attacker
The white box adversary has access to model parameters, training data and
trained weights to generate adversarial samples. We evaluate the performance of
different models under FGSM [5] and PGD [15] attacks with L∞ distance. The
different iterations of PGD attack are denoted by PGDk. For example, PGD
with 10 iterations is denoted with PGD10.
We evaluated the performance of InceptionV3 model under FGSM and PGD
attack. The results are present in Table 1 with perturbation value of  = 16.
The table also presents results corresponding to standard JPEG compression
and Bitdepth reduction that have been shown to be effective when defense is
not known to the attacker. These transformations are applied at the inference
time to transform the sample before feeding it to a pre-trained InceptionV3
network. The recent work on DNN guided JPEG compression [14] was shown
to achieve state-of-the-art results when compared with other input transfor-
mations like image quilting, standard JPEG and bitdepth. While JPEGDNN
GraCIAS 11
Table 1. ImageNet 10K validation set: Comparison of different input transformation
based defense on InceptionV3 model. The table reports defense classification accuracy
under FGSM, PGD40 and PGD100 attacks with an attack magnitude of  = 16
Attack ImageNet10K (InceptionV3)
No def JPEG BitDepth JPEGDNN GraCIAS
(ICLR’18) (ICLR’18) (CVPR’19) (Our)
FGSM 22.88 25.32 24.76 26.21 37.63
PGD40 0.0 0.65 0.27 3.52 42.49
PGD100 0 0.0 0.23 3.01 44.32
performs well in low perturbation setting, the performance drops for high per-
turbation value of  = 16 as reported in the table. Our approach outperforms
previously best known result using JPEGDNN as input transformation.
Fig. 3. Performance Comparison of various defenses across different magnitude of 
using (Left) FGSM and (Right) PGD10 attacks on InceptionV3 model.
Fig. 4. Performance comparison of different defense
strategies under different magnitude of FGSM at-
tack on ImageNet dataset for VGG16 and ResNet50
models.
Performance across dif-
ferent Perturbation Mag-
nitude. We evaluated the
performance of our defense
strategy over a range of per-
turbation magnitude for both
PGD and FGSM attacks and
compared with state-of-the-
art approaches. The results
are shown in Figure 3 for
InceptionV3 and for VGG16
and ResNet50 in Figure 4.
The results indicate that Gra-
CIAS sustains for larger
range of perturbation before
dropping at large magnitudes
of perturbations.
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4.3 Adaptive Adversary
The recent work [1] showed that existing input transformation based defense
strategies can be attacked with a strong attacker that has access to the de-
fense strategy as well. A non-differentiable defense strategy can be defeated
with BPDA (Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation) that approximates
the gradient with identity while backpropagating through the transformation
layer to develop strong attacks. We show that the proposed defense strategy can
withstand such attacks as opposed to existing defense strategies. The results in
Table 2 indicate that the proposed approach achieves state-of-the-art results on
both InceptionV3 and ResNet50 models with approximately 4% improved over
state-of-the-art results. We also validated the efficacy of our approach across
different perturbation magnitude as well as attack iterations in Fig 5 and show
that GraCIAS achieves non-trival accuracy as opposed to current state of the
art input defense JPEG DNN.
Table 2. ImageNet Validation Set: Performance Comparison of defense classification
accuracy under BPDA attack ( = 16, iteration 40) on InceptionV3, ResNet50, Mo-
bileNet and VGG16 models. * indicates that the results are quoted from the respective
paper, in the absence of open source implementation.
Models
Defense Apply InceptionV3 ResNet50 MobileNet VGG16
JPEG [6] Only 9.82 0.0 0.0 0.0
(ICLR ’18) Inference
JPEG DNN [14] Only 13.12 0.35 0 18.38
(CVPR ’19) Inference
*BaRT k =5 [20][ Finetune+ NA 16.0 NA NA
(CVPR ’19) Inference
*BaRT k =10 [20] Finetune+ NA 36.0 NA NA
(CVPR’19) Inference
GraCIAS Only 19.65 41.94 35.6 21.5
Our Inference
To further ensure the effectiveness of proposed defense strategy, we also eval-
uate it against EOT (Expectation over Transformation), where attacker aims
to capture the randomness in the transform by performing the transformation
multiple times and use the average gradient. However, owing to presence of
randomness at different steps of the transformation, the expectation over trans-
formations fails to capture the randomness in the transform, even with as large
as 100 runs. The InceptionV3 model achieved an accuracy of 40.19% over 100
steps of EoT. Further, we also investigated the combination of the two i.e. BPDA
+EoT, where the defense achieved an accuracy of 19.1% similar to BPDA alone.
Effect on Clean Sample Accuracy. In the absence of detection of adversar-
ial examples, the input transformation strategies are applied to both clean and
adversarial samples, adversely effecting the performance on clean samples. To
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Fig. 5. (Left) InceptionV3 model under BPDA attack with different perturbation
magnitude on ImageNet dataset. The plot highlights that GraCIAS achieves state of
the art results over previously reported with JPEGDNN. (Right) Performance of
defense accuracy on ResNet50 model under different iterations of BPDA attack with
 = 8. While both ResNet50 and VGG16 are completely defeated at increased attacker’s
strength, GraCIAS still achieves non-trival defense performance.
cope with this drop, network fine-tuning is done with the proposed defense, prior
to applying defense at the inference time. We report that with GraCIAS, per-
formance on clean samples drop by 16 and 23 % for Inception and ResNet50
models on ImageNet without fine-tuning. However, this drop can be reduced
with network fintuning as suggested by BaRT that achieves 65% on clean sam-
ples against original clean sample accuracy of 76%, i.e. 11% drop. Due to limited
hardware resources, we verified this on ResNet model for CIFAR10, where the
fine-tuned model regained the drop by 8%, suggesting similar benefits for Ima-
geNet dataset on finetuning with our defense strategy.
5 Ablation Study
We now investigate the choice of parameters in our defense strategy. While the
range for percentage of variance in data to be retained as well as range of number
of filters is fixed across all the experiments, the parameter like filter size can
depend on the dimension of the image. Also, performance of image operations
to create the corrupted image set is evaluated under adaptive attack setting to
validate the effectiveness of random filters over others.
Effect of Filter Size. The goal of our filtering operation is to develop a diverse
yet informative set of images to estimate a subspace that retains task-relevant
information. This effect can be verified from the results in Table 3 ImageNet
datasets for two different perturbation magnitudes across three different filter
sizes.
The results are reported in the adaptive attack setting (PGD +BPDA) to
show the effect in stronger attack scenario. The results also point to the fact
that in most real world applications, higher image resolutions are encountered,
the choice of filter choice is not difficult.
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Table 3. (Left) Effect of selecting different transforms to create the set of corrupted
image given in Eq. 1 needed for our GraCIAS defense. (Right) Effect of filter size
on defense performance on ImageNet dataset at different perturbation levels under
adaptive adversary (BPDA+PGD) with 100 iterations
Operation Defense Accuracy
Gaussian Filter 17.11
Affine Transformation 11.86
Symmetric Transformation 7.29
Filter Size  = 8  = 16
3 17.11 16.41
5 17.43 18.90
7 22.38 19.65
Table 4. ImageNet-10K: Performance of simple defenses
with GraCIAS used as pre-processing at the inference time
on various models with  = 16 under PGD10 attack. The
boost in the performance is indicative of GraCIAS ability to
restore the image details making it easier for much simpler
defense like JPEG and BitDepth to defend the attack
Defense Accuracy
InceptionV3 ResNet50 VGG16
JPEG 5.58 39.2 18.9
GraCIAS → JPEG 44.26 45.14 31.79
BitDepth 0.42 39.38 27.95
GraCIAS → BitDepth 25.97 43.79 29.89
Random Filters vs.
Other Transforms.
We evaluated the ef-
fect of different im-
age transforms to cre-
ate the set of images
in Eq. 1 required for
defining the subspace.
The results for the
same are given in the
Table 3. The perfor-
mance suffers a signif-
icant drop with affine
and symmetric trans-
formation, due to the
likely reason that the typically high frequency adversarial noise are still retained
after such transformations.
GraCIAS as Pre-processing Prior to Other Defenses. JPEG compression
and Bit depth reduction are simple input transformations that are very easy
to incorporate in real world systems as they are model agnostic and can be
implemented in hardware as well, however they become ineffective in presence
of large perturbation as well as adaptive adversary. Since the proposed defense is
also inexpensive in terms of computation resources for its implementation, it can
be used to complement these defenses to retain their defense capabilities. The
results in Table 4 show improvements on ImageNet dataset under PGD attack.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a simple randomized linear subspace-based input de-
fense approach that is applied at inference time to mitigate the effect of adversar-
ial noise. The proposed approach achieved state-of-the-art results on ImageNet
dataset across four different deep classification networks. The proposed defense
is extensively evaluated on attacks with different strength and magnitude and is
shown to be effective in all cases.
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